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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was tried by a jury in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court in and for Millard County, with the Honorable 
Will L. Hoyt presiding, for the offense of carnal knowledge, 
alleged to have been committed on or about July 15, 1953, 
on the person of June Peer, who was then 15 years of age. 
The complainant was the mother of June Peer (T. 2). 
The only evidence introduced by the State and received 
by the court to prove the charge was: 
(a) A birth certificate showing June Peer to have 
been 15 years of age at the time of the alleged offense 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
(b) A confession of the offense in the hand writ-
in of Eldon A. Eliason, County Attorney for Millard 
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County, allegedly dictated to him by the defendant on 
·or about July 22nd, 1953, in the office of Sheriff Cul-
bert Robison in Fillmore while the defendant was un-
der arrest (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). 
(c) The testimony of Sheriff Robison as to state-
ments made by June Peer and the defendant in the 
presence of each other, himself, ~nd County Attorney 
Eliason in Eliason's office in Delta on July 30, 1953, 
which statements, as related by the Sheriff, were dec-
larations of participation in intercourse by June Peer 
and confessions of guilt by defendant (T. 106 to 113). 
The record contains considerable conflicting testimony 
taken outside the presence of the jury on the question as 
to whether or not the alleged confessions of the defendant 
were voluntary (T. 6-103), and the court ruled that they 
were (T. 101-102). 
Although the trial had been set approximately three 
months prior to the time it was held, the State did not have 
present either the complainant or June Peer, and intro-
duced no evidence other than above set forth, circumstantial 
or direct, showing or tending to show that June Peer had 
ever had sexual intercourse with anyone. The state as-
signed to the court as the reason for not having the com-
plainant and June Peer present that they were in the state 
of California, had been there some six weeks, and though 
subpoenaed and requested more than once to be· present 
they would not appear (T. 2). 
Upon a verdict of guilty, the court pronounced judg-
ment that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, 
and sentenced him to imprisonment in the state prison for 
a term not to exceed five years. (See Minute Entry Dec. 5, 
1953). 
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STATEI\IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN THAT THIE STATE 
FAILED TO PROVE OR TO INTRODUCE ANY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE THE COR-
PUS DELICTI, INDEPENDENT OF THE CONFESSIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDier AND JUDGMENT IN THAT THE STATE 
FAILED TO PROVE OR TO INTRODUCE ANY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE THE COR-
PUS DELICTI, INDEPENDENT OF THE CONFESSIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
This Court held in State vs. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 
P. (2d) 1010 that there must be independent proof of the 
corpus delicti before a confession can be received for the 
consideration of the jury. See also State vs. Jessup, 98 Utah 
482, 100 P. (2d) 969, and State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 
120 P. (2d) 285. Since the decision in the Johnson case, 
the point of law decided therein has been annotated in 127 
A. L. R., commencing at page 1130, and it appears there-
from that some 41 jurisdictions have adopted the same or 
a substantially similar rule. The rule is particularly appli-
cable to sexual offenses. See annotation in 40 A. L. R. 460. 
At page 1069, Volume 2 of \Vharton's Criminal Evi-
dence, we find the following statement: 
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"It is practically universally held that the corpus 
delicit of a crime cannot be proved by an extrajudi-
cial confession standing alone, but must be proven in-
dependly of it. Moreover, a verdict of guilty and a 
subsequent conviction cannot be sustained upon an ex-
trajudicial confession only. Stated conversely, the rule 
is that an extrajudicial confession of the accused must 
be corroborated by independent proof of the corpus 
delicit of the crime." 
The corpus delicit of the crime of carnal knowledge 
obviously includes the fact of intercourse. That June Peer 
actually had sexual intercourse at or about the time alleged 
would have to be proved, or at least there would have to 
be some evidence tending to prove the same, independent 
of the confession of the defendant, before the defendant 
could be convicted. The trial judge seemed to concede the 
rule, but would not apply it in this case, because he appar-
ently concluded that the declarations of participation by 
June Peer in intercourse with the defendant and the acquies-
cense of the defendant in such declarations, as testified to 
by Sheriff Robison, was sufficient independent proof of the 
corpus delicit to justify receiving in evidence the defend-
ant's written confession (T. 102 and 151). This, we sub-
mit, cannot be the law for it either permits the proof of the 
corpus delicit by strictly hearsay evidence or renders mean-
ingless the almost universal rule above stated. 
If the declarations of June Peer to the effect that she 
had intercourse with the defendant had not been made in 
the presence of the defendant, but only in the presence of 
the Sheriff and the County Attorney, such statements would 
be pure hearsay and inadmissible. What, then, may make 
such statements admissible, under certain conditions, when 
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made in the presence of the defendant? Wharton in his 
work on Criminal Evidence, Volume 2, Page 1, says: 
"It may be stated as a general rule that, when a 
statement is made in the presence and hearing of an 
accused, incriminating in character, and such state-
ment is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, 
both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny 
are admissable on a criminal trial as evidence of his 
acquiescence in its truth. A statement so made would, 
of itself, be objectionable as hearsay testimony, being 
a statement made at some time other than at a pres-
ent trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter there-
in asserted, and based entirely on the credibility of a 
declarer not then before the court. However, as in the 
case of admissions generally, the statements herein 
considered are not offered as evidence of their truth 
merely because they were uttered; they are secondary 
in nature and are accepted in evidence as untainted by 
the hearsay stigma merely because they are a neces-
sary predicate to the showing of the substantive evi-
dence, the reaction of the accused theretQ." (Boldface 
supplied) 
This principle is well illustrated by the rule that a 
statement made by a person who would be incompetent to 
testify is, nevertheless, admissible in evidence when made 
in the presence of the defendant and not denied by him. 
\Vharton Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, pp. 1094. And this 
Court said in State vs. Snow®n, 23 Utah 318, 65 P. 479, at 
pp. 482-483: 
"The complaint was not admitted as original evi-
dence of the truth of the facts therein sworn to, but 
simply as a necessary incident, explaining and charac-
terizing the nature of defendant's acquiescence or con-
fession. Admissions and confessions may be implied 
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fron1 the acquiescence of the party in the statements 
of others made in his presence, when the circumstan-
ces are such as afford an opportunity to act or speak, 
and would naturally call for some action or reply from 
men similarly situated . . And it makes no dif-
ference that the statements which call for a reply are 
made by a party who is incompetent to testify . . . '' 
We believe the conclusion is inescapable that the dec-
larations of June Peer could not have been received in evi-
dence by the trial court for any purpose, save and except 
they may be considered as admissions or confessions of the 
defendant; and if they were received in evidence on that 
basis, they are no better than direct admisions or confes-
sions of the defendant, and, therefore, could not be used as 
proof of the corpus delicti. 
It is patent that in the case at bar there was absolutely 
no proof, even circumstantial ,showing or tending to show 
that a crime had been committed, independent of the con-
fessions of the defendant. Certainly two confessions of the 
same alleged crime at different times would not each be 
independent proof of the corpus delicti, furnishing a basis 
for the admission in evidence of the other. If that were 
true, all that would be necessary to satisfy the rule above 
set forth would be for the sheriff or the prosecuting attor-
ney to make sure that the defendant repeated his confes-
sion in the presence of a witness one minute, five minutes, 
an hour, a day, or a week after it was first obtained, and 
then the corpus delicti would be considered proved by in-
dependent evidence. "Independent evidence" must mean 
evidence independent of the defendant's confessions, wheth-
er there be one or a dozen instances of confessing the same 
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crime. See Forte vs. United States, 68 App. D. C. 111, 94F 
(2d) 236, 127 A. L. R. 1120. 
CONCLUSION 
We are strongly of the opinion that there is absolutely 
no competent evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, and 
that therefore, the judgment of conviction should be re-
versed. The Court's attention is respectfully called to the 
motion of the District Attorney for a continuance at the 
beginning of the trial and the resistance of the defendant 
to the motion (T. 1-2). The defendant had been in jail 
from the time of his arrest in July until the trial in Decem-
ber ,and the judge, in denying the motion, stated that the 
State had had ample time to produce the complainant and 
the alleged victim. In this we concur, and for this Honorable 
Court to merely grant the defendant a new trial now would 
be in effect granting the State's motion. We respectfully 
ask, therefore, that the case be reversed with instruction to 
the trial court to dismiss the action in acoordance with the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, made at the conclusion of 
the State's case. 
Respectfully submited, 
ALDRICH & BULLOCK, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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